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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals and Utah Code Annotated 78-4-11 (1953, as amended).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BElLOW
This Appeal is from a final Judgment of the Circuit Court, State of Utah,
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Department.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FtOR REVIEW
1. Did Diagnostics International, Inc. (hereaiter "Diagnostics"), have the
right to cure the alleged defects of the blood circulation testing equipment pursuant to
70A-2-508, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
2. Did Defendant-Respondent, Richard Uhl (hereafter "Uhl"), accept the
equipment within the meaning of 70A-2-606(l)(c), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended).

STATUTES BELIEVED TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE RESPECTIVE ISSUES STATED
70A-2-508. Cure by seller of improper tender or
delivery—Replacement,
(1)

Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected
because non-conforming and the time for performance
has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably notify
the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within
the contract time make a conforming delivery,

(2)

Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender
which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe
would be acceptable with or without money allowance
the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have
a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender.

70A-2-508 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).

70A-2-606. What constitutes acceptance of goods.
(1)

(2)

Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a)

after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the
goods signifies to the seller that the goods are
conforming or that he will take or retain them in
spite of their nonconformity; or

(b)

fails to make an effective rejection (subsection
(1) of section 70A-2-602), but such acceptance
does not occur until the buyer has had a
reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or

(c)

does any act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership; but if such act is wrongful as against
the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by
him.

Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is
acceptance of that entire unit.

70A-2-606 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Diagnostics sued Uhl to recover the sum of $4,595.00 owing on a
Promissory Note which was given to Diagnostics to pay the balance due on an
equipment purchase. Uhl counterclaimed against Diagnostics to recover the sum of
$450.00, representing a down payment on the equipment and shipping costs to return the
equipment to Diagnostics.
The Trial of the case was held on July 22, 1985 before the Honorable
Eleanor S. Van Sciver.
The Court ruled that Uhl was entitled to a Judgment of no cause of action
against Diagnostics on Diagnostics1 Complaint and that Diagnostics was entitled to a
Judgment of no cause of action against Uhl on Uhl's Counterclaim.
Diagnostics moved the Court for an Order amending the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, to set aside the Judgment and for a new Trial. On July 28,
1987, the Court denied Diagnostics' motion and this appeal followed.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties stipulated to most of the facts in this case at the beginning of
the Trial. (Transcript of Trial, pp. 3, 4, 5 and 6.)
On or about February 14, 1984, Diagnostics sold to Uhl a vasculizer (blood
circulation testing equipment) for a purchase price of $4,995.00. Uhl paid $400.00 down
and executed a Promissory Note for $4,595.00, which became due on April 14, 1984.
The Promissory Note bears interest at the rate of eighteen per cent (18%) per annum.
Uhl failed to pay the Promissory Note when due, although on April 17,
1984, Diagnostics made demand of Uhl by certified mail for payment.
Uhl experienced problems with the finger prooe and the foot pedal on the
first day he operated the equipment. The equipment itself operated properly. The
finger probe and foot pedal are plugged into the vasculizer and can be removed and
easily replaced. (R. 67, Findings of Fact and Conclusions! of Law, entered March 13,
1987, at p. 2.)
On the same day he found out about the problems with the equipment, Uhl
advised Diagnostics by telephone of the problems with the probe. Diagnostics advised
Uhl in that conversation that the probe could be replaced v^ithin a matter of hours. Uhl
told Diagnostics that he did not desire the defective parts to be replaced, and would not
accept the equipment as he had purchased two other similar machines from another
supplier. (R. 67, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)|, entered March 13, 1987, at
p. 2.)
When Mr. Tarpey, president of Diagnostics, learned that Uhl refused to
permit him to send out replacement parts representing onty a minor fraction of the cost
of the vasculizer, he advised Uhl that if he would return the equipment, the $400.00
down payment would be refunded and the Promissory Noti cancelled. (R. 67, Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered March 13, 1987, at p. 2.)
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Uhl refused to return the equipment. Instead he told Diagnostics to refund
his $400.00 down payment, and return the promissory note after which he would return
the eqiupment. (R. 67, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered March 13,
1984, at pp. 2, 3; Exhibit D-l, Letter to Diagnostics from Uhl.)
Mr. Tarpey of Diagnostics did everything possible to resolve the dispute.
Uhl admitted that Diagnostics had performed every agreement punctually that it made
with him and that he had no good reason to believe that Diagnostics would not refund
his money if he would return the equipment and had no reason to question Diagnostics1
integrity. (Transcript of Trial, p. 44.)
Diagnostics had no alternative but to sue on the Note after Uhlfs refusal to
go along with either proposal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT ONE
70A-2-508O) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) defines a seller's
right to cure a non-conforming tender. The seller may notify the buyer of his intent to
cure and may then cure within the time of performance specified in the contract.
70A-2-508(2) permits the seller to cure beyond the date set for seller's
performance when three conditions are met. In order for this section to apply, (1) a
buyer must have rejected a non-conforming tender; (2) the seller must have had
reasonable grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable; and (3) the seller must
have "seasonably" notified the buyer of the intention to substitute a conforming tender
within a reasonable time.
Upon satisfying those requirements, the seller is entitled to cure.

-A-

Uhl advised Diagnostics immediately that the lf*nger clip on the probe had
failed and that the foot pedal was not working properly. There was clearly nothing
wrong with the vasculizer itself. The probe was easily detachable from the vasculizer
and could be replaced. It represented a very minor fraction of the value of the machine.
In the same telephone conversation in which UJil advised Diagnostics of the
problems, Diagnostics offered to replace the probe withinl a matter of hours, but Uhl
told Diagnostics that he would not permit the defective prc^be to be replaced, as he had
purchased two other similar machines from other sources.
The defective probe represented only a mindr non-conforming tender by
Diagnostics. Diagnostics' offer to replace the probe represented a good faith effort to
make a conforming delivery within the contract time and fulfilled the requirement of
seasonable notification to the buyer under 70A-2-508(1) Utjah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended).
Diagnostics also fulfilled

the requirments 01 auDsecuon (2) in that

Diagnostics had "reasonable grounds to believe" that the vasculizer would be
acceptable. There were never any problems with the vasculizer itself. Uhl tested the
equipment upon receipt and found it to be working properly. The only difficulty that
Uhl experienced was with the finger clip on the probe and Diagnostics offered to
replace that easily detachable item within a matter of hlours. Uhl refused to permit
Diagnostics to cure the defect as required by the foregoing Section of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
POINT TWO
Under 70A-2-606(l)(c) a buyer accepts the gbods when he "does any act
inconsistent with the seller's ownership". Any action taken by the buyer, which is
inconsistent with his claim that he has rejected the goods, constitutes an acceptance
under paragraph (c).
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When Uhl refused

to permit Diagnostics to cure the defect

under

70A-2-508 and arbitrarily refused to return the equipment conceding that he had no
reason for doing so, he exercised dominion over the vasculizer while at the same time
proclaiming expressly that he was rejecting it. Under those facts, Uhl accepted the
goods under 70A-2-606(l)(e) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
When Diagnostics learned of Uhl!s dissatisfaction with the equipment, it
agreed to return the down payment and the promissory note if Uhl would return the
equipment. Uhl stubbornly refused to return the equipment or permit Diagnostics to
cure the minor defect.
Uhl admitted that he had no good reason to believe that Diagnostics would
not refund his money if he would return the equipment and that he had no reason to
question Diagnostics1 integrity.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DIAGNOSTICS HAD THE RIGHT TO CURE THE
ALLEGED DEFECTS OF THE BLOOD CIRCULATION
TESTING EQUIPMENT PURSUANT TO 70A-2-508,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, as amended)
Uhl told Diagnostics when he ordered the blood circulation equipment that
he needed it immediately because he had some tests scheduled. (Transcript of Trial, p.
31)
Diagnostics told Uhl that if he would send a certified check for $400.00 and
a promissory note payable within sixty (60) days by Federal Express, Diagnostics would
be able to have the equipment in his hands the next day. Uhl Federal Expressed the
$400.00 certified check and the promissory note to Diagnostics and Diagnostics put the
instrument on a plane and it was delivered to Uhl the next day. (Transcript of Trial, pp.
8 & 9)
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Upon receipt of the equipment, Uhl inspected i|t and determined that it was
working properly. (Transcript of Trial, p. 34)
On the first day that the equipment was used, Uhl experienced difficulty
with the finger clip on the probe. He thereupon called diagnostics and reported the
difficulties. (Transcript of trial, p. 35)
Diagnostics offered to replace the probe within a matter of hours. Uhl
advised Diagnostics that he had already bought two machines from another source and
refused to permit Diagnostics to replace the defective probe. (Transcript of Trial, p. 17)
The probe is an attachment to the vasculizer and has nothing to do with the
instrument itself. Failure of the clip on the finger probe was a minor non-conforming
defect that did not substantially impair the value of the vasculizer to Uhl. (Transcript
of Trial, pp. 10 and 13)
When Mr. Tarpey, president of Diagnostics learned that Uhl would not
permit him to send a new probe and refused to accept and pay for the equipment he
advised Uhl to return it and the down payment would be ijefunded and the promissory
note returned. (Transcript of Trial, p. 17)
Uhl thereupon told Diagnostics that he would riot return the machine until
Diagnostics first refunded the down payment and returned the promissory note. Uhl
followed up on that telephone conversation with a letter to Diagnostics reiterating what
was said in the telephone conversation. (Transcript of Trial, pp. 19 and 20)
Uhl testified that he had no good reason to belfeve that Diagnostics would
not refund his money if he would return the equipment.

Q
Isn't it a fact that he had performed punctually
every agreement that you made with him?
A

Well, I think t h a t -

Q

Is that or is that not true?
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A
As a businessman would do, I feel that he did
what a business—a person in business would do, yes.
Q
So, you really have no good reason to believe
that he wouldn't refund your money?
A.
No. ITm not questioning his integrity
anything like that. (Transcript of Trial, p. 44)

or

70A-2-508O) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) gives Diagnostics
the right to cure the non-conforming tender of the blood circulation testing equipment.
The draftsmen f s comment clarifies the meaning of the foregoing section:
Purposes:
1. Subsection (1) permits a seller who has made a
non-conforming tender in any case to make a conforming
delivery within the contract time upon seasonable
notification to the buyer. It applies even where the seller has
taken back the non-conforming goods and refunded the
purchase price. He may still make a good tender within the
contract period. The closer, however, it is to the contract
date, the greater is the necessity for extreme promptness on
the seller's part in notifying of his intention to cure, if such
notification is to be "seasonable" under this subsection.
The rule of this subsection, moreover, is qualified by its
underlying reasons. Thus if, after contracting for June
delivery, a buyer later makes known to the seller his need for
shipment early in the month and the seller ships accordingly,
the "contract time" has been cut down by the supervening
modification and the time for cure of tender must be
referred to this modified time term.
2. Subsection (2) seeks to avoid injustice to the seller by
reason of a surprise rejection by the buyer. However, the
Seller is not protected unless he had "reasonable grounds to
believe" that the tender would be acceptable. Such
reasonable gounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of
performance or usage of trade as well as in the particular
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract. The
seller is charged with commercial knowledge of any factors
in a particular sales situation which require him to comply
strictly with his obligations under the contract as, for
example, strict conformity of documents in an overseas
shipment or the sale of precision parts or chemicals for use in
manufacture. Further, if the buyer gives notice either
implicitly, as by a prior course of dealing involving rigorous
inspections, or expressly, as by the deliberate inclusion of a
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"no replacement" clause in the contract, the [seller is to be
held to rigid compliance. If the clause appears in a "form"
contract evidence that it is out of line wth trade usage or the
prior course of dealing and was not called 10 the sellerTs
attention may be sufficient to show that the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe that the tender would be
acceptable.
3. The words "a further reasonable time to substitute a
conforming tender" are intended as words of limitation to
protect the buyer. What is a "reasonable timer depends upon
the attending circumstances. Compare Section 2-511 on the
comparable case of a seller's surprise dem|and for legal
tender.
4. Existing trade usages permitting variations without
rejection but with price allowance enter into nie agreement
itself as contractual limitations of remedy and are not
covered by this section.
Diagnostics demonstrated that it was able to ship equipment to Uhl and
have it in his possession the day after the order was Placed.

When Uhl advised

Diagnostics of the difficulties with the finger clip on the ptobe, Diagnostics offered to
replace the probe within a matter of hours but Uhl refused | to permit Diagnostics to do
so.
Diagnostics is required to "make a conforming delivery within the contract
time upon seasonable notification to the buyer". Under the foregoing section of the
Uniform Commercial Code, having offered to replace thd probe within a matter of
hours, it cannot be argued by Uhl that Diagnostics was not in a position to perform
within the contract time. "Seasonable notification" was given by Diagnostics to Uhl
that Diagnostics would be in a position to make a conforming delivery of the probe
within a matter of hours. Notification was given by Diagnostics to Uhl of the offer to
make a conforming delivery in the same conversation in which Uhl advised Diagnostics
of the difficulties he was having with the equipment.
The promptness on Diagnostics' part in notifyiiig of its intention to cure is
"seasonable" within the meaning of the foregoing sectionL
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70A-2-508(2) Utah Code

Annotated (1953, as amended) requires that Diagnostics had "reasonable grounds to
believe" that the tender of the blood circulation equipment would be acceptable. Upon
receipt of the equipment, Uhl tested it and found it to be working properly. Uhl knew
that Diagnostics manufactured new blood testing equipment. It can, therefore, be said
that Diagnostics had "reasonable grounds to believe" that the tender of the vasculizer
would be acceptable to Uhl.
Uhl flatly refused to permit Diagnostics to exercise its rights under the
foregoing sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. Diagnostics1 right to cure was
unconditional at the time Uhl refused Diagnostics offer to replace the probe.
In Joe Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 434
NYS2d 623 (Sup Ct, 1980) defendant contracted to buy a cargo of oil represented as
having a sulfur content of .5%. Defendant rejected the oil when it was reported by an
independent tester as having a higher sulfur content. The court ruled that defendant
was required to accept a proffered cure of defective delivery in the form of a
substitute conforming shipment scheduled to arrive one week later. The court further
held that the defendant was liable to the seller for the loss occasioned by its refusal to
accept the oil.
The sellerTs right to cure is unconditional within the time set

for

performance in the contract. Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 NJ 277, 440 A2d 1345 (1982).
In Uchitel v. F. R. Tripler & Co., 434 NYS2d 77 (NY Sup Ct, 1980) plaintiff
brought an action for breach of warranty based upon some alleged defects in garments.
The court stated that Section 2-508 provides an exception to the requirement of an
immediate perfect tender. A seller is permitted to cure an initial impoper tender and if
a buyer unreasonably refuses to permit a seller to exercise this right to cure, no breach
of warranty action premised on the defect sought to be cured may be maintained. In

-10-

the foregoing case, the defendant had peremptorily refusedl defendant seller a chance to
cure defects in missized and misfitted garments.
A seller should have recourse to the relief afforded by Section 2-508(2) as
long as it can establish that it had reasonable grounds, tested objectively and in
accordance with UCC standards, to believe that the goods would be accepted. T.W. Oil,
Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 57 NY^d 574, 457 NYS2d 458, 443
NE2d 932(1982).
In Traynor v. Walters, 342 F Supp 455 (DCMD Pa., 1972) the buyer of
Christmas trees had rejected on December 8 and December 14 two deliveries of
non-conforming

Scotch

Pines.

An offer

by the

seller

to cure both

of

the

non-conforming deliveries which was communicated to the| buyer on December 14 was
seasonable under UCC § 2-508(1).
In Reese v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 184 SE2d 7J22 (1971) the court held that
under the provisions of § 2-508 the manufacturer of a new automobile was entitled to
an opportunity to correct minor defects in the body of the car and the buyer who did
not accept the manufacturer's offer to make the repair^ free of charge could not
rescind the contract of sale claiming breach of warranty.
UhlTs refusal to permit Diagnostics to cure thd minor defect in the finger
clip on the probe of the vasculizer was unreasonable under the circumstances and he is
liable to Diagnostics for the purchase price of the equipment. The evidence is clear
that Uhl peremptorily refused to permit Diagnostics to cure the defects on the probe.
Even though he rejected the vasculizer, the rejection did not discharge the contract and
he should be held liable for the contract price of the equipment.

-i
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POINT TWO

UHL ACCEPTED THE EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE
MEANING
OF
70A-2-606(l)(c)
UTAH
CODE
ANNOTATED (1953, as amended)
Under 70A-2-606(l)(c) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) a buyer
accepts the goods when he "does any act inconsistent with the sellers ownership." In
this case, Uhl exercised dominion over the vasculizer conceding that he had no good
reason to do so. At the same time, he proclaimed expressly that he had rejected the
equipment. Under 70A-2-606(l)(c) he has accepted the goods.
The official comment to this section states:
. . . . 4. Under paragraph (c), any action taken by the buyer,
which is inconsistent with his claim that he has rejected the
goods, constitutes an acceptance. However, the provisions of
paragraph (c) are subject to the sections dealing with
rejection by the buyer which permit the buyer to take certain
actions with respect to the goods pursuant to his options and
duties imposed by those sections, without effecting an
acceptance of the goods. The second clause of paragraph (c)
modifies some of the prior case law and makes it clear that
"acceptance" in law based on the wrongful act of the
acceptor is acceptance only as against the wrongdoer and
then only at the option of the party wronged.
In the same manner in which a buyer can bind himself,
despite his insistence that he is rejecting or has rejected the
goods, by an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership
under paragraph (c), he can obligate himself by a
communication of acceptance despite a prior rejection under
paragraph (a). However, the sections on buyer's rights on
improper delivery and on the effect of rightful rejection,
make it clear that after he once rejects a tender, paragraph
(a) does not operate in favor of the buyer unless the seller has
re-tendered the goods or has taken affirmative action
indicating that he is holding the tender open.
The receipt and retention of goods tendered by delivery have been held
sufficient to constitute an acceptance under Section 2-606(l)(a) J.L. Teel Co., Inc. v.
Houston United States, Inc., 491 So 2d 851 (Miss, 1986) also see Ho v. Wolfe, 688 SW2d
693 (Tex App, 1985).
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Uhl received and retained possession of the v&sculizer when he conceded
that he had no good reason to do so. He refused Diagnostics offer to cure the minor
non-conforming tender. When Diagnostics agreed that Uhl could return the equipment,
he refused even though he admitted that he had no reason to believe that Diagnostics
would not refund his own down payment and return the promissory note.
Having exercised dominion over the goods, he accepted them within the
meaning of Section 2-606(1 )(c) and obligated himself to pay the contract rate for the
goods accepted.
CONCLUSION
Under the facts of this case, the applicable statutes and case law,
Diagnostics had the unconditional right to cure the minor non-conforming tender of the
vasculizer. Uhl arbitrarily refused to permit Diagnostics to pffect a cure.
Uhl!s actions in exercising dominion over the equipment and unjustifiably
retaining it were inconsistent with his claim that he had rejected the machine. These
actions constituted an acceptance of the vasculizer.
Based on the foregoing analysis, Diagnostics relspectfully requests that the
lower court's decision be reversed and that judgment pe entered against Uhl in
accordance with the relief sought in the Complaint.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1987.

FRANCIS J. NIELSON
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
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